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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
A mineral servitude is an indivisible right.1 7 It is admitted
that the defendant used the servitude; therefore he was in pos-
session of it; and if he was in possession of it, this possession in-
terrupted the possession of the plaintiff. If this conclusion is
adopted, the possession of the defendant was not "continuous and
uninterrupted" as required by Article 348718 and therefore the
prescription was not completed. According to the French authori-
ties, once possession is interrupted, prescription stops running.
When possession is regained, a new prescription begins to run.
In the instant case, after the possession of the plaintiff had been
interrupted by the drilling operations from 1922 to 1931, the plain-
tiff was no longer in good faith, since he knew the mineral servi-
tude was owned by the defendant; therefore, in view of the
French authorities, since the plaintiff was in bad faith, he should
have been able to acquire ownership of the mineral rights only
through thirty years bad faith prescription.
However, the Louisiana court in the instant case did not so
hold, but decided that the possession which was started in good
faith continued during the time the drilling and producing opera-
tions were carried on, and that the plaintiff was merely in bad
faith during this period. The court based its decision upon Article
3482,19 which states that possession started in good faith, followed
by subsequent bad faith, does not prevent the running of ten
years good faith prescription.
In view of the fact that the case involved a novel point of
prescription and that no cases in point are available in Louisiana
jurisprudence-it is submitted that the French authorities could
have furnished a basis of a decision more in line with legal prin-
ciples. M.E.C.
QUITCLAIM DEED-BASIS OF TEN YEAR PRESCRIPTION AcQUIRENDI
CAusA-Defendant claims title to a twenty acre tract of land by
ten years acquisitive prescription, basing his good faith on a quit-
claim deed. Plaintiff contends that the unwarranted deed is not
enough for acquiring in good faith: the non-warranty being
enough to excite the defendant's suspicion, put him on guard, and
induce him to make inquiries as to the validity of his title-the
defendant remaining in bad faith until such inquiry is made.
17. Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Clark v. Tensas
Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931). Daggett, op. cit. supra note 4, at
24, § 6.
18. Art. 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Art. 3482, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Held, a quitclaim deed may be the basis for good faith prescrip-
tion acquirendi causa. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corporation, 13
So. (2d) 335 (La. 1943).
Prescription of ten years acquirendi causa applies when "the
possessor has been in good faith and held by a just title during
that time."' The good faith possessor spoken of in Article 3479 is
defined by Article 503 as one "who possesses as owner by virtue of
an act [a title] sufficient in terms to transfer property, the defects
of which [title] he is ignorant of."2 "The possessor in good faith
is he who has just reason to believe himself the master of the
thing which he possesses, although he may not be in fact the
owner, as happens to him who buys a thing which he supposes
to belong to the person selling it to him, but which, in fact, be-
longs to another."" Just title is defined as "a title which the pos-
sessor may have received from any person whom he honestly be-
lieved to be the real owner, provided the title were such as to
transfer the ownership of the property."4
Louisiana jurisprudence has not been uniform in holding that
a quitclaim deed is a valid basis for the good faith prescription of
ten years. Probably the first case on the subject was Reeves v.
Towles.5 The defendant purchased a tract of land at a tax sale.
The contract of sale warranted to the purchaser only the right,
title, and claim of the said owner to the tract of land. The issues
that arose were whether such a title could form a basis of pre-
scription, or whether it disclosed to the defendant a fatal defect
of form in the title of his vendors which in the sense of the Code
cannot serve as a basis of ten year prescription. The court held
that when the vendor is expressly exempted from warranty this
prevents prescription of ten years if such title proves defective.
Carrel's Heirs v. Cabaret7 was cited in the argument for the propo-
sition that a title defective in form is one on the face of which a
defect is stamped; and if the latent defect is known to the posses-
sor, he cannot prescribe.
A later case, Eastman v. Beiller,8 labeled the deed a quitclaim
when the vendor expressly excluded warranty against anyone
except himself, his heirs, and those claiming under him. The court
held the plea of prescription null in that to become the basis of
1. Art. 3474, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 503, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 3451, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Art. 3484, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. 10 La. 276 (1836).
6. Art. 3486, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. 7 Mart. (O.S.) 375 (La. 1820).
8. 3 Rob. 220 (La. 1842).
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ten years prescription "the title must be apparently good, and of
a kind calculated to induce a belief in the possessor that it is per-
fect."9
"Where the vendor sells only his right, title, and interest, and
declines to give a general warranty, and sets out or shows the
kind of claim, title, or interest he conveys, [this] brings home to
his vendee a knowledge of his title.... The fact of a vendor refus-
ing to guaranty the title he gives, is a circumstance calculated to
excite suspicion as to it, and should put a vendee on his guard,
and would, very probably, induce him to make inquiries as to the
validity of the title."'
This case 1 is substantiated by two later cases holding that
the sale of only the right, title, and interest of the various vendors
to an uncertain thing is not an act translative of property and is
not to be a basis for the plea of prescription.
12
The first case where the court implied that a quitclaim deed
could make prescription of ten years possible was Templet v.
Baker, stating that the exclusion of warranty in an act of sale
is not evidence of bad faith on the part of the purchaser. However,
the court held that where the vendee, in an act of sale, declared
that he is acquainted with the title and the title appears defective
when it is exhibited, there is made out against the purchaser a
prima facie case of the want of that good faith necessary in order
to prescribe.
The courts took a decided about face and began a new line of
jurisprudence in the case of Read v. Hewitt.4 In this case the for-
mer jurisprudence was disregarded and it was held that a deed
which conveyed "'all my right title and interest in a certain tract
of land' "' can be the basis for good faith prescription. The court
stated: "there is no material difference between the sale of prop-
erty and the sale of all the vendor's right, title, and interest there-
in, because such a transfer includes all that the vendor can sell or
the purchaser acquire.1 6 The common law rule was cited and fol-
lowed.'7
9. Id. at 223.
10. Id. at 224.
11. 3 Rob. 220 (La. 1842).
12. Thomas v. Kean, 10 Rob. 80 (La. 1845); Avery v. Allain, 11 Rob. 436
(La. 1845).
13. 12 La. Ann. 658 (1856).
14. 120 La. 288, 45 So. 143 (1907).
15. 120 La. 288, 289, 45 So. 143, 144.
16. 120 La. 288, 291, 45 So. 143, 144.
17. 13 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (1904) 655, cited in Read v.
Hewitt, 120 La. 288, 292, 45 So. 143, 144 (1907): "A conveyance of all the
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In Clayton v. Rickerson"8 the court held that a quitclaim deed
possessed no defect in form as is set out in the Code.19 Such a
decision was manifestly contrary to the rule of the Towles case,'2 0
which held that such a defect constituted a defect in form. The
court refused to allow the lack of faith of the vendor in his title to
affect the good faith of the vendee, holding that the lack of the
seller's good faith is a matter of no importance with regard to the
prescription of ten years.
The doctrine was again advanced in Land Development Com-
pany v. Schultz.2' Here the court held that a deed that is a quit-
claim only has no apparent defect and will not destroy the pur-
chaser's good faith, saying: "The fact that the sale ... was made
without warranty of title does not affect the plea of prescription
of ten years. A stipulation in an act of sale that the seller does not
warrant the title might be regarded as an indication that the
seller lacked faith in his title, but is not an indication that the
buyer lacked faith in the title. '1 2
Perkins v. Wisner2' and Perkins v. Louisiana Land and Explo-
ration Company24 followed the old line of jurisprudence. The
court, however, in both cases reversed itself upon rehearing, bas-
ing its decision upon Read v. Hewitt2 5 and a United States Su-
preme Court case from the state of Nebraska.'2
Seemingly, our early jurisprudence and the spirit of our Code
have been disregarded. This has come about by permitting an
infiltration of our jurisprudence 27 with rules applicable to the
common law quitclaim deed, rather than by controlling our quit-
claim deed with an interpretation of our own good faith articles.
It is the writer's opinion that a quitclaim deed certainly can-
not offer the purchaser a positive belief that he is the true owner
and therefore should be held to create a doubt that should pre-
vent good faith. J. N. H.
grantor's right, title, and interest in and to certain described property will
be construed as a conveyance of all his estate in such property, and the whole
estate will vest in the grantee."
18. 160 La. 771, 107 So. 569 (1926).
19. Art. 3479, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. Reeves v. Towles, 10 La. 276 (1836).
21. 169 La. 1, 124 So. 125 (1929). See also Nugent v. Urania Lumber Co., 16
La. App. 73, 133 So. 420 (1931).
22. 169 So. 1, 10, 124 So. 125, 128 (1929).
23. 171 La. 898, 132 So. 493 (1930).
24. 171 La. 913, 132 So. 499 (1930).
25. 120 La. 288, 45 So. 143 (1907).
26. Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 21, 13 S.Ct. 426, 37 L.Ed. 350 (1893).
27. Ibid.
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